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M ecca Cola versus Coca-Cola
Uri Ram
Ben Gurion University
A B S T R A C T  The Mecca Cola drink combines in its brand name two 
contrasting iconic images: one signifies ‘authenticity’ , whereas the other 
signifies a ‘commodity’ . The conspicuous juxtaposition of ‘Mecca’ and 
‘Cola’ and their hyphenization evokes the question: what is becoming of 
‘authenticity’ in a thoroughly commodified world society? This article 
proposes that a distinction ought to be drawn between the effects 
of commodification on two distinct levels: the structural and symbolic. 
Whereas commodification homogenizes structurally, it heterogenizes 
symbolically. This article maintains that while symbolically Mecca Cola is 
antagonistic to Coca-Cola, structurally it is a case of an appropriation of the 
former by the latter. Mecca Cola thus attests to a structural ‘Cola-ization’ 
accompanied by a symbolic ‘Mecca-ization’ of current world cultures.
k e y w o r d s  Americanization, authenticity, Coca-Cola, commodification, 
consumption, globalization, material culture, Mecca Cola, Muslim culture
Mecca Cola is a bottled or canned sweet, sparkling soft drink, which 
simulates in taste, design and appeal the world-famous American brand 
Coca-Cola. The declared purpose of the businessman who created the 
Mecca Cola brand is to offer Arab and Muslim customers an alternative 
to the American product, which for many symbolizes American cultural 
capitalism, and as of late also American military imperialism in the 
Middle East.
‘Mecca’ and ‘Cola’ are strange bedfellows. The brand name Mecca Cola 
conjures together two iconic images which ordinarily are related to two 
distinct and even contrasting cultures: the culture of ‘authenticity’ versus 
the culture of ‘artificiality’ . The conspicuous juxtaposition of ‘Mecca’ 
and ‘Cola’, their hyphenization, so to speak, evokes questions about the 
relations between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ , ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ , 
the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’, and ‘America’ and ‘Islam’ . In short, it evokes the 
question: what is becoming of ‘authenticity’ in a thoroughly commodified 
world society? No naive concept of authenticity is assumed here and we 
choose to present the term with quotation marks in order to acknowledge
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that nothing is ‘really’ authentic; everything is socially constructed. Yet 
despite this caveat, there may be elements of ‘authenticity’ to any given 
cultural artifact, which may depend on the conditions of its construction: 
is it home-grown or ‘imported’? Is it evolutionary or revolutionary? Is it 
engineered or spontaneous? Does it suit the culture in which it is situated 
or is alien to it? and so forth.1
So the question we address here is whether the universalization of 
capitalist commercialization and commodification poses a threat to the 
viability of particular communities and identities. Can such communities 
and identities stave off this challenge? Or does this encounter breed a 
new hybrid of ‘glocal’ cultures? Such questions had been immanent 
before September 11, 2001 and they have become more so ever since. This 
article argues that while each of the three propositions above is correct in 
part, their combined composition has remained largely undertheorized. 
It proposes that a distinction be drawn between the structural and the 
symbolic effects of commodification and that the effects on these two 
levels are divergent: whereas commodification homogenizes structur­
ally, it heterogenizes symbolically. It maintains that Mecca Cola is a case 
in point, attesting to a structural ‘Cola-ization’ accompanied by a symbolic 
‘Mecca-ization’ of current world cultures.
This material culture study is inspired by Karl Marx’s well-known thesis 
of the ‘fetishism of commodities’ in the first volume of Capital (Marx, 
1976[1867]). There and in other texts (notably The Communist Manifesto) 
he (and Engels) decree that in a market-based society, everything solid 
in human relationships and culture melts in the air; all relationships and 
values are subsumed by the bare monetary nexus and — even more poign­
antly in our context — ‘all that is holy is profaned’ (Marx and Engels, 
1972[1848]: 476), or, in our case, ‘all that is holy becomes liquid’ (Bauman, 
2000). This article argues that the case of Mecca Cola, as well as other 
related instances of global exchanges discussed below, vindicate this 
Marxian proposition, only adding that it is the peculiarity of present-day, 
global post-Fordist capitalism that its effects are two-layered; namely 
structural homogenization accompanied by symbolic heterogenization.
This article proceeds in four steps. First, it examines the new article of 
consumption branded Mecca Cola. Second, it looks into the original brand 
of Coca-Cola. Third, it discusses further cases of the commodification of 
religious articles, especially in the context of Islam. Finally, it discusses 
the available theoretizations of present commodification and proposes its 
own contribution to this area, in the form of the aforementioned double­
layered structural-symbolic model.
Mecca Cola
The product ‘Mecca Cola’ was inaugurated in the end of 2002. It was 
466 contrived by Tawfik Mathlouthi, a Tunisian-born French businessman
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who, in the telling phrase of western media, sought to ‘cash in ’ and 
attempted to ‘capitalize on’ anti-American sentiment around the world 
(Henley and Vassar, 2005: 1; Murphy, 2005: 1; see www.meccacola.com). 
In this case ‘cash in’ and ‘capitalize on’ have a literal as well as metaphorical 
resonance. Mathlouthi’s product appeals to Muslims with the hope of 
competing with the sales of Coca-Cola, which is identified as an ‘icon of 
American capitalism’ (Murphy, 2005: 1). Explaining this to a reporter, 
Mathlouthi added:
[It is all about combating] America’s imperialism and Zionism by providing
a substitute for American goods and increasing the blockade of countries
boycotting American goods. (Murphy, 2003: 1)
This is not the first time that Coca-Cola has been imitated by a ‘Muslim’ 
substitute. Zam Zam Cola is an Iranian beverage launched after the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979 and is named after a holy spring in Mecca. 
It is reported to be a success in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Arabic News, 
2002; see http://zam zam group.com ). A parallel article which carries 
the name Qibla Cola was launched in the UK in 2005. The word Qibla 
means ‘direction’, and in common Arabic usage it refers to the direction of 
Mecca towards which Muslims turn when they pray. Qibla Cola presents 
itself as an ‘ethical alternative’ to global multinational corporations 
(see www.qibla-cola.com; Bevis, 2004). Cola Turka (Turkish Cola) was 
launched by the Ulkar company in Turkey in 2005, and it is couched in 
Turkish national images (see www.colaturka.com.tr/anasayfa/index. 
html). All these brands are explicitly Halal (permissible for consumption 
by Muslims). Mecca Cola is a growing phenomenon and not an isolated 
episode.
Mecca Cola was initially marketed to Muslim customers in Europe. It 
was launched in France and exported to Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The drink found its way into small 
‘ethnic shops’ in Muslim neighborhoods, and later it arrived on the 
shelves of large cash-and-carry supermarkets in some European countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany). Soon afterwards the brand became a great 
hit in Middle Eastern and other Muslim markets. According to one source, 
in 2005 Mecca Cola was distributed in 64 countries and sold 148 million 
cans. It ranks 54th in the top 50 brands in the world (Baranowski, 2007). 
According to the producer, recent furores in the Muslim world over the 
Danish cartoons (in which the Prophet Mohammed was portrayed) or the 
Pope’s comments on Islam were directly felt in the rise of sales. Recently, 
Mecca Cola invested $15 million in an industrial complex in Dubai, which 
opened three factories by September 2007. Additionally, the company 
has added Mecca Tea, Mecca Coffee and Mecca Power to the Mecca Cola 
brand (Baranowski, 2007). The company now plans to launch a Muslim 
alternative to the Starbucks coffee chain, in the form of a chain of coffee 
shops under the brand name Mecca Café. The first shop is planned for 467
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Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, to be followed by branches in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia and Islamabad, Pakistan (Shakir, 2006). In 2005, 
Mecca Cola was both the sponsor and the official drink of the summit of 
the Organization of Islamic Conferences held in Malaysia.
Mecca Cola is fraught with Muslim symbolism yet is encased in the 
insignia of American capitalism. The shape and size of the bottles, the dark- 
purple color of the drink, and the ‘handwritten’ fonts and the swirl shaped 
logo, all make it an unabashed imitation of Coca-Cola. The difference is 
first and foremost in the label where ‘Coca’ is replaced by ‘Mecca’, the holy 
city of Islam (in Saudi Arabia). Second, it is publicized that 10 percent of 
the profits are dedicated to charities operating in Palestinian territories 
and that another 10 percent are passed to international peace-oriented 
non-governmental organizations based in Europe. The Mecca Cola label 
reads ‘Don’t drink stupid, drink committed’, referring to the ‘stupid’ (or 
perhaps also ‘stupefying’) consumption of the American brand, in contrast 
to the politically committed consumption of the Muslim rival. In the eyes 
of its founder, each bottle of Mecca Cola sold is ‘a little gesture against 
US imperialism and foreign policy’ (Henley and Vassar, 2005: 1).
The Mecca Cola case is another part of a widening multifaceted 
conflict between the US and the Muslim and Arab world in the wake of 
the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, and of the 
US reactions to these attacks through the ‘War on Terror’ , which began 
in Afghanistan in 2002 and continued in Iraq in 2005. In the Muslim and 
Arab world, America has been widely perceived for a long time as the 
‘Big Satan’ who steadily supports the ‘Small Satan’ : Israel. This support 
is a source of popular Muslim and Arab infuriation, which occasionally 
erupts in attacks on US targets, demonstrations and riots in front of 
outlets of American international chains such as McDonald’s restaurants, 
as well as occasional attempts to boycott American brands (see Barboza, 
2002; Bayat, 2005). Playing on Coca-Cola’s slogan ‘The Taste of Life’ , one 
reportage on Mecca Cola asserts that ‘Muslim activists decided the Real 
Thing left a sour taste’ (Henley and Vassar, 2005: 1).
Thus, what Mecca Cola stands for is a kind of ‘Iced war’ waged by Arab 
and Muslim producers and consumers against a product widely perceived 
as a symbol of America, its culture and imperialism. That such an innocent 
drink could have acquired such an elevated and protean symbolic status 
is in itself an intriguing expression of the commodified society.
So why Coca-Cola? How does a trivial object such as a sweet fizzy 
beverage become a symbol of a nation, or indeed of a whole civilization — 
the civilization of consumption? What is it about this artifact that attracts 
so many consumers, so much attention and so much hostility? Igor Kopytoff 
(1986) proclaims that ‘things’ have a ‘cultural biography’ (as particular 
items) and ‘social history’ (as brands) of their own. As Dick Hebdige (1988) 
468 puts it, ‘things’ have ‘cultural significance’. These claims relate not only to
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small-scale shifts in an object’s meaning but also to broader transformations 
in the organization of material culture itself (Lury, 1996). So let us take 
a brief account of the ‘cultural biography’ of the Coca-Cola ‘thing’ . To 
begin with, how had this commodity assumed the status of the American 
emblem?
Coca-Cola
The blend of what would becom e Coca-Cola was first m ixed by a 
pharmacist in Atlanta, GA in 1886 as a ‘Coca wine’ , after a French wine 
called Vin Mariani. Like many other drinks produced at the time, it was 
hailed as soothing, vitalizing and healing, and especially appropriate for 
the nervous American personality. These characteristics were imputed 
to it because some of the ingredients it might have incorporated, extracts 
from coca leaves from Central America and kola nuts from West Africa, 
contain the alkaloids cocaine and caffeine, as well as some other exotic 
plants. As the Coca-Cola myth goes, in their societies of origin coca and kola 
allegedly acted for hundreds of years as stimulants, aids to digestion, 
aphrodisiacs and even life-extenders (Pendergrast, 2000). Due to the 
pressures of the ‘temperance’ movement the alcoholic components were 
removed, and by a trial-and-error process the concentrate was mixed with 
carbonated water.
The name ‘Coca-Cola’ was coined in 1886 and the company was 
granted its official corporate charter and a patent of its trademark in 1892.
In short course the beverage has became practically bereft of the two 
ingredients which give it its name and which were probably present in its 
inception. Coca-Cola has not contained any trace of cocaine since 1905 and, 
according to a court ruling from 1919, most of its caffeine now comes from 
tea leaves rather than kola nuts. Until 1899 the beverage was dispensed 
by soda fountains in drugstores; since that time it has been dispensed in 
glass bottles and, much later, in plastic bottles and cans. What began as 
the venture of a single pharmacist in the late 19th century continued in 
the early 20th century as a family business, and was fashioned in the 1920s 
as a professionally-managed corporation.
By 1900 Coca-Cola had become ‘not simply a soft drink, but a phe­
nomenon’ (Pendergrast, 2000: 87). By 1912 it was reputedly the single 
best-advertised product in the US and ‘had begun to permeate every aspect 
of American life’ (Pendergrast, 2000: 89). In the era between the world 
wars, Coca-Cola made ingenious use of new, massively-consumed home 
and family implements such as the radio, refrigerator and automobile to 
advertise, market and dispense the drink. The Second World War gave 
the drink an immense boost. Its agents followed American troops on all 
fronts and served them. W hile being already an ‘all-American’ artifact, 
Coca-Cola acquired an even deeper emotional significance during the 
war. A letter from a soldier imparts the way in which Coke was widely 469
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perceived by the American troops: ‘a taste of home in the midst of the 
hell of war’ (Pendergrast, 2000: 198):
It’s the little thing, not the big, that that the individual soldier fights for or 
wants so badly when away. It’s the girlfriend back home in a drugstore over 
a Coke, or the ]ukebox and the summer weather ... To have this drink is ]ust 
like having home brought nearer to you; it’s one of the little things of life 
that really counts. I can remember being at Ponce de Leon Park, watching 
the [Atlanta] Crackers play baseball as I filled up on Coca-Cola and peanuts. 
It’s things such as this that all o f us are fighting for. (cited in Pendergrast, 
2000: 206)
Another wrote:
To my mind, I am in this damn mess as much to help keep the custom of 
drinking Cokes as I am to help preserve the million other benefits our country 
blesses its citizens with, (cited in Kuisel, 1993: 53)
W hile the drink was sold abroad from the 1920s, its presence outside 
the US was meager. In the wake of the war, as if to vindicate the position 
of the US as a leading world power, Coca-Cola became truly international. 
In 1950, one-third of its profits came from abroad (Pendergrast, 2000: 255). 
Sales expanded exponentially; while it took decades to sell the first mil­
liard gallons of Coca-Cola syrup, it took only seven years, from 1944 to 
1955, to sell the second milliard (Pendergrast, 2000: 244). Being a con­
spicuous capitalist symbol in the eyes of both friends and foes, Coca-Cola 
accompanied America in the Cold War era. Being conceived by Americans 
as a representation of their culture, Coca-Cola came to be identified with 
America by others. For the communist world during the Cold War the 
drink represented ‘degenerate capitalism’ (Pendergrast, 2000: 254), to 
which the president of the corporation, Robert Woodruff, responded that 
‘it was natural for the Reds to resent Coca-Cola, since it was “the essence 
of capitalism” ’ (Pendergrast, 2000: 240). The essential role of Coca-Cola on 
the ideological front was splendidly depicted by the New York Inquirer-.
You can’t spread the doctrine o f Marx among people who drink Coca-Cola ... 
The dark principles of revolution and a rising proletariat may be expounded 
over a bottle of vodka on a scarred table, or even a bottle o f brandy; but it is 
utterly fantastic to imagine two men stepping up to a soda fountain and 
ordering a couple of Cokes in which to toast the downfall o f their capitalist 
oppressors, (cited in Kuisel, 1993: 63)
Coca-Cola was still there when the Iron Curtain collapsed. In the event of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall the drink was part of the celebration. During the 
1980s and 1990s, Coca-Cola further enhanced its universal image without 
missing any mega-opportunity (such as the Olympic Games) to make itself 
visible and identified with the ‘spirit’ of sport, music and joy.
Hence by 1945, observes Mark Pendergrast, the historian of the 
company, ‘Coca-Cola was America’ (2000: 206) and it ‘developed a psy- 
470 chological significance akin to an icon or rare religious relic’ (2000: 207).
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Richard Kuisel, a cultural historian of France, comments that ‘Perhaps 
no commercial product is more thoroughly identified with America than 
Coca-Cola’ (1995: 52).
The advertisements for the drink have been soaked with a panoply of 
‘Americana’ — views and sounds widely identified as symbols of American 
life such as shots of the Grand Canyon, wheat fields, cowboys, athletes 
and the Statue of Liberty, and Coca-Cola itself became a leading symbol 
of the all-American way of life and the ‘American Dream’ . More than any 
single other artifact, Coca-Cola succeeded in blending popular culture 
with a commercial product.
The special emotional significance of Coca-Cola to Americans, its 
unique status in American symbolic culture, gained striking expression 
in 1986, when the company announced a change in the taste of Coca-Cola in 
response to a steady small decline in its share of sales compared to the 
main competition, Pepsi Cola. The announcement provoked an outcry 
and became a major topic of discussion for months. The public responded 
with grief and dismay. The company was inundated with messages of pro­
test at the alteration of what had become a revered symbol of American 
tradition. As one letter put it: ‘Would it be right to rewrite the Constitution?
The Bible? To me, changing the Coke formula is of such a serious nature’; 
another wrote: ‘There are only two things in my life: God and Coca-Cola.
Now you have taken one of those things away from me’ (Pendergrast,
2000: 556).
Under heavy pressure from consumers, who turned their backs on 
the new Coca-Cola, the company was finally compelled to return the 
old product, which it did under the name of ‘Coca-Cola Classic’ (skeptics 
allege, however, that the whole thing was a publicity stunt).
In sum, it became a convention to identify Coca-Cola as ‘the American 
character in a can’, as Newsweek put it (cited in Pendergrast, 2000: 554). As 
Pendergrast suggests, ‘Coca-Cola was emblematic of the modern American 
attempt to package pleasure ... an instant pick-me-up’ (Pendergrast, 2000:
95). Yet, the ‘American character’ is not one solid whole, and one of Coca- 
Cola’s features as a signifier has been its ability to denote the combined 
strands of that ‘character’ : the special American blend of popular and 
commercial culture, the common American national sentiment, and the 
pervasive American capitalist (and anti-communist) ethos. Furthermore, 
Coca-Cola excelled in its historical and social flexibility: its image has 
continued to adapt to changes in cultural fashions and has kept expanding 
to newer consuming sectors, becoming more and more ‘democratic’ and 
‘inclusive’.
One secret of the success of Coca-Cola has been its versatility or even 
elasticity, such as its blend of the ‘new’ and the ‘traditional’. The image 
of the drink has changed over time, always representing the spirit of the 
age. So, for example, while in the first half of the 20th century it depicted 
American ‘family values’, it was also quick to latch onto the more profligate 471
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youth culture in the second half of the century. This found expression, 
inter alia, in the female figures appearing in the drink’s advertisement: 
over the years they became thinner and more sexually explicit. The design 
of the Coca-Cola bottle illustrates the way in which Coca-Cola adapted 
itself to American taste. In 1916 Coca-Cola designed its uniquely shaped 
bottle (Pendergrast, 2000). Stuart Ewen, a student of popular culture, 
explains that Coca-Cola’s ‘hobble-skirt’ bottle (nicknamed ‘Mae West’) was 
inspired by the bounteous ideals of Victorian womanhood. The indented 
waist of it separated a full bosom from broad hips. Fifty years later in 1996, 
the design of the bottle was brought up to date by drawing upon the 
changed profile of idealized femininity: the bottled was elongated, and 
thus put on a diet (Ewen, 1988; Loewy, 1979).2
Coca-Cola is one the most, if not the most, recognized icons of modern 
American culture.5 The particular shape of its bottle, and the blown logo 
in its glass surface, represents what cultural analyst David Nye describes 
as ‘the fusions of materiality and meaning through the praxis of design’ 
(1997: 95). The Coca-Cola bottle ‘was more than a guarantee of origins; it 
was advertisement, trademark and product, rolled into one’ (1997: 69). In 
Nye’s interpretation, icons of modern consumer culture play a necessary 
cultural function; they preserve the sense of the ‘real’ (or authentic) in 
a world becoming increasingly artificial. In this regard they play a role 
equivalent to the platonic form: all Coke bottles in the world ‘represent’ 
the ‘Real Thing’ — one of Coca-Cola’s most known advertising campaigns 
(‘an icon’s form appears to transcend variability and time, to become an 
idealized object’ ; 1997: 102).
In addition to American ‘authenticity’ , the icon has what Nye calls 
a kinetic impact: its visual form is identified with its sensory qualities 
(in the case of Coca-Cola, the sense of a cool, fizzy and refreshing liquid, a 
theme intensively elaborated in the advertisements). Coca-Cola, like other 
items-turned-icons of its kind such as Marlboro cigarettes, blue jeans or 
McDonald’s hamburgers, came to manifest what Nye calls ‘the consumer’s 
sublime’ of America (1997: 106—7).
Today, Coca-Cola is the top brand in the world with revenues of $67 bil­
lion, followed in order respectively by Microsoft, IBM, GE, Intel, Nokia, 
Toyota, Disney, McDonald’s and Mercedes-Benz (Business W eek , 2006).
The question presented here assumes an additional weight now: 
what has the ‘American character in a can’ or the ‘consumer’s sublime’ 
of America to look for in the realm of Allah? Let us turn now to a 
few further cases beyond Mecca Cola which demonstrate the effect of 
‘Coca-Colonization’.
M ega-Cola
Muslim societies, like all world societies, live today under the ‘Coca-Cola 
472 impact’ , a shorthand term for the commodification, McDonaldization or
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Americanization of the world. Mecca Cola is a product of this Zeitgeist. 
Notwithstanding the declared intent of blocking and countering American 
cultural influence over the Muslim and Arab world, Mecca Cola is in fact 
not a response to Coca-Cola, but stands for the categorical adaptation to 
‘Coca-Cola-ism’ or ‘Coca-Colonialism’ . The fact that consumers ‘drink 
committed’ rather then ‘drink stupid’ , as Mecca Cola advertisements 
suggest, does not reduce the impact of Americanization as culture but only 
amplifies it, even while ‘America’ as a state is being vilified.4 That Muslim 
culture undergoes such a process of adaptation is documented by other 
studies. Such studies underscore the extent to which, in order to persist in 
the context of a global commercial culture created by global corporations 
such as Coca-Cola, Muslim culture must adapt to the practical ways of 
life, symbolic codes and material culture of consumer society. Therefore, 
the more people succeed in ‘drinking committed’ (Mecca Cola), the 
more in fact they ‘drink stupid’ (Coca-Cola).
In their study of the ‘branding’ of Islamic mosques, Hilday Teegen 
and Marta Teegen (2000) argue that in today’s world, Muslim culture 
is ‘branded’ and ‘marketed’ , indeed ‘objectified’ , along lines similar to 
those of commercial merchandizing. In their study of the ‘visual lan­
guage’ of mosques located in urban environments in Cairo, Los Angeles 
and New York, they found that the symbols used to mark the exterior 
of storefront mosques are constructed with aims comparable to those 
applied by commercial corporations: gaining ‘customer’ loyalty to the 
‘product’ , the perceived quality of the ‘product’ , positive associations with 
the ‘product’ and ‘product’ awareness. This is expressed in the visible 
decorative forms of storefront mosques, such as the usage of Arabic fonts 
or Arabic words in Latin alphabet in textual signs; the display of dome­
shaped images, which are at times cut out of plywood and attached to signs 
or the buildings; and the extensive use of the color green in decorations 
on the mosques.
Teegen and Teegen comment that ‘the standardized symbols found 
on the exteriors of storefront mosques have taken on a fixed meaning 
(namely Islam) and ... they are strung together into a coherent picture 
of the whole’ (Teegen and Teegen, 2000: 250). They emphasize that the 
visual signs which came to be identified as ‘Islamic’ do not necessarily 
represent the distinct traditions of the communities who practice Islam 
in these mosques. Moreover, the creation of a ‘standardized’ version of 
Islam by its branding diminishes the great heterogeneity among Muslim 
communities. By incorporating dome images into storefront mosques, 
‘Muslims have ... successfully appropriated an image identified with 
Islam in a Euro-American tradition (through such films as Disney’s Aladdin) 
in their process of self-identification’ (Teegen and Teegen, 2000: 228). 
In other words, Muslim identity publicizes and reproduces itself through 
corporate-made images produced by corporations such as Disney, and in 475
E U R O P E A N  J O U R N A L  O F  C U L T U R A L  S T U D I E S  1 0 ( 4 )
the case of the soft drink, by Coca-Cola. To use Benjamin’s Barber powerful 
metaphors,/z'A«^ is a creation of McWorld, not its opposite (Barber, 1995:157).5 
In Teegen and Teegen’s words:
As com m odities-on-display, storefront Mosques are themselves sites of 
consumption; the decorative vocabulary em ployed on their exteriors is 
the result of the internalization o f a perceived idea o f what constitutes 
an Islamic identity (the so-called ‘Disneyfication’ o f Islam). (Teegen and 
Teegen, 2000: 230)
What indeed takes place behind the backs of Muslim believers is that 
religious practice is rendered into commercial forms. This translation, 
while apparently leaving religion intact or even enhanced, in fact changes 
radically the meaning of religion, making it into a commodity. Thus
the investment in the creation of a brand image by the producer o f a product 
or by leaders of a religious community is in effect the creation of a social norm 
within the relevant market segment ... By branding a religion, followship is 
created through social networks „ . a s m a  commercial setting where brand 
images must visually represent key customer benefits, brands for religions 
must use symbols and icons that are supported by/positively associated with 
the (religious) beliefs. (Teegen and Teegen, 2000: 231)
This process of ‘marketization’ of religion is embedded in the context 
of globalization. In the case of the mosques, the context is an urban global 
space. The two opposing mega trends of globalization are at work here: 
practical (even material) homogenization, which levels distinctions; 
and symbolic heterogenization, which is made necessary exactly because 
of the global ‘ironing’ of differences. While any ‘product’ must turn into 
a standardized ‘brand’, it must also be branded slightly differently from 
others in order to gain a promotional advantage over them. Thus, on the 
one hand, the marketing of Islamic space involves the collapsing of hetero­
geneity into a single global practice, while on the other, ‘local’ identity is 
carefully differentiated from a ‘competition’ by its visual symbols (such 
as Arabic calligraphy, dome shapes and green colors). Teegen and Teegen 
label this process of branding a ‘strategic response to globalization’ 
(2000: 252). In summary, Teegen and Teegen maintain that
strategically, the three symbolic elements: the color green, the dome images 
and Arabic text elements reduce Islam to a common denominator that can 
safely transcend the various divisions and distinctions within the faith, and 
thus the brand’s value is enhanced globally in terms of loyalty, association 
and awareness in particular. (2000: 232)
Another case is offered by Yael Navaro-Yashim’s study of the ‘fashioning’ 
of the Islamic veil and other attire. Whereas Teegen and Teegen analyze 
the ‘branding’ of Islam, Navaro-Yashin analyses the ‘fashioning’ of Islam. 
She reports how in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, during a period of 
474 tension between secular nationalist modernizers (bearers of Ataturk’s
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heritage) and Islamic (neo-)traditionalists (followers of Turgut Ozal), 
the commodities market emerged as one of the major arenas in which 
contending identities were constructed around goods which served as 
‘identity markers’ for each side, so that ‘there were now commodities to 
label every identity’ (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 229).
Navaro-Yashim reports that:
Politics o f culture betw een secularists and Islamists in Turkey in the 
[time] ... developed in the context of consumer market influenced by glob­
alization [and] so central was consumerism to the social life of this period 
that political conflicts were organized, expressed and mediated through this 
medium. (2002: 222)
In fact, capitalism in general, and consumerist capitalism in particular, 
advanced in Turkey in two parallel versions, secular and religious, so that 
‘there is now [a] fully fledged commodity market for both Islamist and 
secularist identities in Turkey’. Navaro-Yashin relates further that ‘cultural 
identities were packaged up to be assumed in commodity form. Battles 
over political difference were waged through the medium of consumption’ 
(2002: 225). And so, as new goods were put on the market by companies, 
new forms of ‘being’ and ‘identity’ were shaped as well. Businesses began 
to craft and sell ‘Turkish authenticity’, whether secularist or Islamist. 
Consumers assumed that there was ‘authenticity’ in what they wore and 
ate, although market-produced (2002: 250).
Of special interest, because of their visibility and because they have 
come to symbolize a ‘clash of civilizations’ in Europe, especially France, 
are the veil and the headscarf. Since the mid-1980s they appeared in 
the public sphere in Turkey as elsewhere in the Muslim world, and little 
later also in Europe, as the ultimate symbol of Islamization, and hence 
one of the most acrimonious bones of contention between secularists 
and fundamentalists. This re-traditionalization in the conditions of 
present-day globalization has acquired the name of ‘New Veiling’ (MacLeod, 
1991). Cinar Alev describes the rivalries grouped around the veiling issue 
as a ‘new political paradigm’ (2005: 85).6
What is important from the perspective of this study is that women’s 
veils, as well as headscarves, overcoats and other ‘Islamic’ female outfits 
and attire, have become commodified and fashioned. One businessman 
from the Tekbir brand, which grants itself the title of ‘The world trade­
mark in covered women’s clothing’ , related his concept of Islamic con­
sumerism, especially women’s traditionalist ‘covered’ fashion:
There were women who decided to cover after seeing the varieties in our 
exhibition. W e worked on this concept in our advertisements: we used the 
images of covered women as doctors, students and business executives. W omen 
thought that they would be forced to ‘enter sack’ [i.e. dress dowdily] if they 
practiced Islam. W e broke this conception. All organs of the media had to 475
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admit that covering is beautiful. What preachers could not accomplish through 
their sermons, we were able to communicate through our shops and fashion 
shops, (cited in Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 235)
Yet it did not escape the gaze of more orthodox Muslims that hedonistic 
capitalism and ascetic Islamism can hardly prevail together. As a Muslim 
columnist wrote:
W e opposed ... fashion shows on the grounds that they eroded a thrifty 
philosophy o f life and the Islamic principles of modesty, asceticism, and 
abstention from worldly pleasures. These fashion shows were approved by 
Muslims who submitted to the hegemony of capitalist relations of business, 
(cited in Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 242).
Navaro-Yashin summarizes the transmutation of the veil (and other 
such symbols) under the conditions of consumerism in a Baudrillardian 
reflection upon the ‘pure signifier’ :
Now women consumed ‘veils’ in and o f themselves, rather than for what they 
stood for. The struggle for Islamic life and politics had been diluted, in the 
process of consumerism, into a struggle for ‘the veil’ alone. It was no longer 
required of sigmfiers to even produce neat effects of reality. Tekbir veils did 
not have to represent ‘Islamic morality’ in an unproblematic way for them 
to be popularly worn. Veils were only sigmfiers now, not requiring the other 
half o f the orderly binary pair (a signified). (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 242)
Navaro-Yashim’s own interpretation of her very perceptive observa­
tions differs from the interpretation of the same findings which is offered 
in this article (as expounded more fully below). She accepts the com­
modification of meaning and authenticity as a common fact, arguing that 
the fact that identities are produced in the context of the marketplace 
‘does not diminish their personal or existential meaning and potency’ 
(Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 242). In her view, since identities are not ‘real’ in 
the essentialist sense of the term, it does not matter that they are com­
modified. However, in such a case she loses any critical grounds and has 
to accept any constructed identity at its face value.
Comparable observations regarding the fashioning of the Muslim 
female headscarf and related accessories in Turkey are offered by 
Ozlem Sandikci and Gulez Ger. They also find that consumerism had a 
great impact on the practices associated with women’s covered fashion. 
They find a major concern of Muslim women with ‘beautification’ ; ‘to be 
well groomed, adorned and beautiful’ , and they indicate that ‘this con­
cern might have been considered as conflicting with two tenets of Islam: 
avoidance of waste and sexual attention’ (Sandikci and Ger, 2004: 75). 
Yet in their view, ‘the emphasis on appearance indicates not only changes 
in what religious covering means, but at a deeper level the quest for 
being ‘modern’ (2004: 78). They contest the notion of a contrast between 
‘Islam’ and ‘consumerism’ and argue that, rather than considering the 
476 scarf to be a ‘fixed signifier’ of either oppression or opposition, it may
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be considered an ‘unstable sign’ , ‘a cultural codifier of the tensions and 
promises of modernity’ (2004: 78). They maintain that there is no reason 
to identify veiled women with traditionality: ‘The headscarf ruptures 
this linear and structural reading of the relationship between Western 
fashion and modernity, complicating the notion that there is no space 
for fashion and modernity in Islam’ (2004: 78). However, their argument 
is cyclical. If they convince their readers that there is no tension between 
Islam and consumerism in contemporary Turkey, they convince them 
that the Islamic mode of life has been rendered into something undiffer­
entiated from modern capitalist culture. As Olivier Roy puts it, ‘When 
everything has to be Islamic, nothing is’ (Roy, 2004: 40). In this case the 
veil may be considered indeed as just another fashion item of shopping, 
beautification and other consumerist rituals. But how did this come to 
pass? Let us now turn again to the meta-empirical concerns raised at the 
beginning of the article.
M eta-Cola
In the literature on relations between the global and the local, there are 
two major approaches to the questions of authenticity versus commodi­
fication, and the local versus the global: one which gives priority to 
com m odified homogenization, and one which gives priority to local 
(neo)-traditional heterogenization. The former generally predicts the 
Americanization of various cultures; the latter usually registers the re­
silience of local cultures and a variety of fusions between the global and 
the local. The impulse of the ‘local’ suspends, refines, or diffuses intakes 
from the ‘global’ , so that ‘authentic’ , traditional and local cultures do 
not dissolve; rather, they ingest global flows. The former approach 
is known as cultural imperialism, Disneyization, Coca-Colonization 
and McDonaldization (Bryman, 1999; Ritzer, 1995; Tomlinson, 1991; 
Wagenleitner, 1994); the latter is known as creolization, hybridization 
and indigenization (Bhabha, 1994; Hannertz, 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 
2005). For the sake of simplicity we shall call the former a ‘one-way’ ap­
proach, seeing the effect as emanating from the commodified global to 
the ‘authentic’ local; and the latter a ‘two-way’ approach, seeing the effect 
as an interchange between the two poles.
George Ritzer is among the most prominent advocates of the one­
way approach. In his book The McDonaldization o f  Society (1995), he 
considers globalization as a sweeping and unequivocal homogenization 
based on technological efficiency, or what Max Weber defined as instru­
mental rationalization. From this perspective, McDonaldization is an 
upgraded version of the prevalent rationalization of the ‘lifeworld’ , a 
process destined to annul all sorts of ‘local’ or ‘authentic’ cultures. It is not 
difficult to discern here the footprints of both liberal and Marxist theories 
of modernization. 477
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Daniel Miller is an advocate of the two-way approach. He considers 
consumers to be active agents who construct their identity through the 
material objects that they consume. In his view:
Estonians, Trinidadians and Philippines all seek to lay claim to what may 
be regarded as the modernity style of Coca-Cola or Marlboro cigarettes, but 
in all three cases they have developed mechanisms for disaggregating the 
qualities symbolized by Western goods into those that they are able to desire 
to accept as against those qualities that they see as evil or at least inauthentic 
to themselves. (Miller, 1998: 18)
Miller believes in the ‘ability of groups to use the variable objectifica­
tions available in a range of commodities to create much more subtle and 
discriminatory process of incorporation and rejection than that allowed for 
in simple models of Americanization or globalization’ (Miller, 1998: 18). 
He thus adopts from Hegel and Marx the theory of ‘objectification’ , the 
development of culture through the externalization of created objects: 
artifacts, and their sublimation as part of the subjects’ enhanced identity. 
Yet by denying the disruptive moment of alienation, the estrangement 
of the objects-cum-commodities under capitalist relations of production, 
he removes from this approach its critical sting.
Based upon the cases and examples discussed above this article now 
wishes to offer a resolution to the theoretical dichotomy which disrupts 
the literature and to suggest a way to transcend the one-way/two way, com­
m odification/authenticity or global/local controversy. This proposal 
reinforces a model suggested earlier, based on analysis of the ‘McDonald- 
ization’ of Israel (Ram, 2004). In place of this dichotomy a model is pro­
posed which differentiates the effects of global commodification on two 
distinct societal levels. It works as follows: both perspectives are valid, yet 
they apply to discrete societal levels. The one-way approach is restricted 
to one level of social reality, the structural-institutional level: patterns 
and practices which are inscribed into material culture, institutions and 
organizations; the two-way approach is restricted to the symbolic-expressive 
level of social reality: the level of explicit symbolization. Finally, in the 
model suggested here, the one-way structural homogenization process and 
the two-way symbolic heterogenization processes are the diverse effects 
of a unitary system.
Whereas each of the rival perspectives in the com m odification— 
authenticity encounter is attuned to only one of these levels, it is proposed 
that commodified globalization be seen as a compositional process that is 
simultaneously one-sided and two-sided, but on two distinct societal levels: 
on the structural level, commodified globalization is a one-way street; but 
on the symbolic level, it is two-way street.
Hence the two-way approach to globalization—commodification, which 
highlights the persistence of cultural ‘difference’ , is valid empirically, 
478 but it does not provide a satisfactory theoretical analysis. It rightly accounts
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for the diversity which does not succumb to homogeneity — Mecca Cola 
appeals to Muslim concerns; Mosques are attractive by their colors and 
shapes; the veil and other women’s cover clothing items are popular. But 
all this happens on the symbolic level. The ‘difference’ that renders the 
local distinctive, or ‘authentic’ , has managed to subsist or even flourish 
anew. Yet at the same time, on the structural level, commodification, the 
great leveler of ‘sameness’, prevails: Mecca has become Coca-Colonized; 
the Mosque has become branded; the veil has become a fashion.7
So, while on the symbolic level Islam may not only be preserved, but 
revived, the actual, even material, terms of life in consumptive Islamic 
societies coincide with those of other capitalist societies. The common 
language formed in institutions and practices is the practical language 
of commercial—instrumental—technological social organization, of the 
commodification—rationalization of social relationships, material cul­
ture, production and consumption. This practical language prevails, even 
as it tolerates, or at points even promotes, diverse expressive-symbolic 
languages.
The distinction drawn here between the structural and the symbolic 
levels, wherein the former is globally homogenized and commodified, 
while the latter retains local heterogeneity and authenticity, is not entirely 
new. It was presaged in two contemporary classical analyses, one by Dean 
MacCannell (1989) and the other by Herbert Gans (1996). In his study 
of modern tourism, MacCannell (1989) proposed the concept of ‘staged 
authenticity’, a commercially manufactured touristic ‘authenticity’ which 
incorporates the ‘other’ within the modern western middle-class order. 
In his study of ethnic identity in America, Gans (1996) proposed the con­
cept of ‘symbolic ethnicity’: a nostalgic allegiance of (third-generation) 
immigrants to the country of origin of their ancestors; a putative ‘ethnic 
revival’ which attests to their acculturation and assimilation in the new 
country. In these cases ‘modernity’ and ‘America’ , respectively, display 
the same fundamental characteristics discerned here with regard to 
commodified globalization: a deep-seated structural uniformity encrusted 
with a veneer of symbolic diversity.8
In other words, the variety of local cultural identities ‘licensed’ and even 
manufactured under global capitalist commercial expansion disguises the 
unified formula of capital, enhancing its legitimacy and fostering its sales. 
It is in this vein that Fredric Jameson (1991) contends that the kaleidoscope 
of identities and styles that characterizes postmodern culture is, in fact, 
an expression of the new — global post-Fordist — production system. The 
oft-changing, oft-fragmenting cycles of postmodern consumption suit the 
technologically-driven cycles of production, by constantly creating new 
markets and constantly marketing inventions. Postmodernity, and the 
new authenticity and identity that it fosters, divulge the cultural logic of 
post-Fordist capitalism (Jameson, 1991).9 479
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This study has shown a number of instances of the process whereby 
global commodities appropriate local traditions. Rick Fantasia’s deduction 
about the commercialized, standardized croissant in France is equally 
applicable to the case presented here: ‘the medium (of the social organiza­
tion of fast food) is the message, and not simply the exchange of equivalent 
cultural “ tastes” ’ (Fantasia, 1995: 254). Indeed, from the end-user’s or 
individual consumer’s perspective, the particular explicit symbolic ‘differ­
ence’ may be a source of some emotional gratification; but from the per­
spective of the social structure, the system of production, consumption and 
material culture, what matters is the exact opposite — namely, the implicit 
structural homogenization spawned by commodification.
This study has illustrated the tensions between com m odified and 
‘authentic’ identities and symbols thereof, and has proposed that the 
relations between the global commodification and the ‘authentic’ local 
should be considered as a composite of the structural and symbolic levels, 
a composite in which the structural inherently appropriates the symbolic, 
yet without explicitly abolishing it. It proposes the term ‘glocommodifica- 
tion’ to capture this model of the subsuming of local symbols by commodified 
structures. Glocommodification is the general drift towards, on the one 
hand, planetary commodification and instrumentalization, and on the 
other, towards a proliferation of symbols of local and ‘authentic’ identities. 
Mecca Cola achieves the opposite of what it declares it does: it dispenses 
the Muslim idiom into the vessels of American commodificd culture. 
W hile ‘Mecca’ wins symbolically, ‘Cola’ wins structurally.
Notes
1. George Ritzer (2003) discusses the difference between the authentic and 
inauthentic in terms of ‘something’ versus ‘nothing’ .
2. For a history and analysis o f Coca-Cola’s bottle, see Gilborn (1978).
In another interpretation the Coca-Cola bottle is described as a ‘breast 
substitute’ (Berger, 1970: 31).
3. Icons are images and ideas converted into three dimensions. They are 
admired artifacts, external expressions of internal convictions, everyday 
things that make every day meaningful: from the Greek eikon — ‘an ob]ect 
o f uncritical devotion’ (Fishwick, 1978).
4. One has to distinguish of course between Americanization as a deep-level 
process, and the circumstantial objections to American foreign or military 
policies.
5. In a parallel though distinct argument, Roy (2004) suggests that the new 
militant Islamism is in large part a result of modern conditions rather than 
a return to pre-modern ones. (Further discussion of his convincing views 
would lead us outside the confines of this article.)
6. Alev’s (2005) exuberant study explores the cultural dimensions of the 
rivalry between modernity versus traditionalism in Turkey, and argues 
that both harness identity politics using similar techniques and for similar
480 modern national projects.
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7. The logic of the argument can be illustrated through the example of 
national flags. On the explicit level, each of the world’s 186 national flags 
is unique in terms of its symbolic make-up (colors, figures, etc.), making 
it significant to the people that it represents. But on an implicit level, all 
flags share the same code of ‘national “ flagness” ’, so to speak: they consist 
of a piece of colored cloth on a pole and, more importantly, they lend 
their followers a sense of common national identity. The same is true of 
the beverages, the designs and clothes discussed here. W hile they look 
‘different’ , their production and consumption relations, and the material 
culture that they involve, are the ‘same’ as the rest of the world.
8. Transnational corporations are quick to take advantage o f multiculturalism, 
post-colonialism and ethnography, and exploit genuine cultural concerns
to their benefit. It is worth quoting at some length a former Coca-Cola 
marketing executive:
Concept. W e don’t change the concept. What we do is maybe change the 
music, maybe change the execution, certainly change the casting, but in 
terms of what it sounds like and what it looks like and what it is selling, 
at a particular point in time, we have kept it more or less patterned 
... [Our activity] has been all keyed on alocal basis, overlaid with an 
umbrella of the global strategy. W e have been dealing with various 
ethnic demographic groups with an overall concept. Very recently ... 
the company has moved to a more fragmented approach, based on the 
assumption that the media today is fragmented and that each of these 
groups that are targeted by that media core should be communicated to 
in their own way with their own message, with their own sound, with 
their own visualization. (Ohmann, 1996: 6—7)
9. Mattel, the manufacturer of the famed Barbie doll, provides another case 
of the commodification of identities. Recently, the company decided to 
diversify the doll’s wardrobe with various ‘folk customs’ . Barbie, who
in 1959 began life as a slim American blonde, became multiracial and 
multinational in the 1980s. One million Barbie dolls are sold each week in 
140 countries (see Varney, 1998). Some are supposed to embody in color and 
form, garments and accessories, the local (feminine) style. But as Varney 
observes, the ‘local’ versions of Barbie are shallow, fabricated images of 
the texture of local life, which is crushed underneath the global marketing 
press. As local identity is lost, multinational Barbies and their counterparts 
become the only available signifiers of local cultures. Hence, ironically, 
the Barbie doll, like other global commodities, offers a surrogate ‘ identity’ , 
a substitute for the absence of a creation of their own. (For a similar 
analysis o f commercial appropriation of the postmodern and post-colonial 
discourse on ‘difference’, see Ono and Buescher (2001), who deciphers the 
commodification o f native American women in the movie Pocahontas; and 
Shugart et al. (2001), who analyze the appropriation of feminist themes in 
the media. For the composite model suggested here, see also Ram, 2004.)
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